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CHAPTER 1
THE INTRODUCTION
1 . OVERVIEW
Growing steadily alongside advanced computer technology
and information sciences is the need for sophisticated
computer security methods. Unfortunately, this need is not
expected to diminish, but instead is continually expanding
as security experts strive to keep pace with the "bad guys"
or intruders, i.e. those who in some way attempt to misuse
computer systems. It is a frustrating struggle as the
experts develop new hardware and software that place
additional locks on the computer systems and the intruders
inevitably find ways to pick them.
There is a hopeful approach to this problem - auditing.
Computer auditing is a function that is based upon detecting
the occurance of predetermined events and then recording
appropriate detailed information about these events as they
occur in the computer system. Different forms of auditing
have been used since the very early days of computing,
usually motivated by integrity or accounting needs rather
than by security concerns. Auditing logs consist of audit
records which an auditor or security officer must manually,
or in some cases with limited automation aids, review for
suspicious events or unusual patterns of use. In reviewing
the logs, the security officer often attempts to discern the
audit trail of a particular user. An audit trail is "a set
of records that collectively provide documentary evidence of
processing used to aid in tracing from original transactions
forward to related records and reports, and/or backwards
from records and reports to their component source
transactions." [DoD85] These review methods are extremely
time-consuming and only marginally effective. Obviously, it
would be quite difficult for a reviewer to detect any well-
disguised intrusions, e.g. those which developed over time
and thus were interspersed among hundreds of benign audit
records. A partial solution to this problem may be tools
based on automated audit trail analysis. Automated analysis,
coupled with auditing techniques which are specific to
security related events, when combined with other computer
security measures can detect intruders. Such systems are
called intrusion detection systems.
Dorothy Denning, one developer of such a system, states
four factors which motivate the development of a real-time
intrusion-detection system [Denn85]
:
1) most existing systems have security flaws that
render them susceptible to intrusions,
penetrations, and other forms of abuse; finding
and fixing all these deficiencies is not feasible
for technical and economic reasons;
2) existing systems with known flaws are not
easily replaced by systems that are more secure -
mainly because the systems have attractive
features that are missing in the more-secure
systems, or else they cannot be replaced for
economic reasons;
3) developing systems that are absolutely secure
is extremely difficult, if not generally
impossible; and
4) even the most secure systems are vulnerable to
abuses by insiders who misuse their privileges.
Thus there is a perceived need for intrusion detection
systems (IDS's) to back up security mechanisms and there are
some promising research efforts to meet that requirement
[Denn82]
,
[Lunt88b]
. All efforts to date on IDS have
concentrated on single site intrusion; this paper provides a
framework for research in intrusion detection systems which
operate within a network environment.
The remainder of this introductory chapter is divided
into four parts. Section 1.1 provides the reader with an
overview of computer security threats and abuses and which
of these might be partially detected with auditing
techniques. Next, Section 1.2 describes current relevent
research in the area of automated audit trail analysis.
Section 1.3 discusses the goals of this research and
provides a brief outline of the remaining chapters.
1.1 COMPUTER SECURITY THREATS
In order to develop a system that can identify
intrusions into a computer system or that can detect
breaches of computer security it is first necessary to
define or characterize these security threats. A threat is
defined as the potential possibility of a deliberate
unauthorized attempt to:
a) access information
b) manipulate information
c) render a system unreliable or unusable [Ande80]
.
An intrusion implies that someone without authority has
gained access to some part of a computer system whether it
be the system as a whole, a host, a particular directory, or
a particular account. Once this person has unauthorized
access to an object, he/she can perform further abuses such
as copying or altering information, granting further
unauthorized privileges to himself/herself and others or
divulging this new found information to other unauthorized
parties. Breaches of computer security imply the improper or
illegal use of proper authority. An example would be an
authorized user who passes out sensitive information to
which he/she has authorized access. One way in which this
is done is through a covert channel. A covert channel is a
communication channel that allows a process to transfer
information in a manner that violates the system's security
policy [DoD85]
. "Every bit of information in the system
(that is, every object) that can be modified by one process
and read by another - directly or indirectly - is
potentially a covert channel." [Gass88]
DEFINITION 1.1 SECURITY POLICY. The set of laws,
rules and practices that regulate how an
organization manages, protects and distributes
sensitive information. [DoD85]
Anderson, in some early research on audit trail
analysis [Ande80] , distinguished between two categories of
computer system intruders:
1) External Penetrators - these persons are not authorized
to use the computer system. They may be from outside
the organization and may not even have physical access
to the computer, or they may be of the organization but
are not intended to use the system. These penetrators
might attempt intrusion by wiretapping or by posing as
an authorized user.
2) Internal Penetrators - these are further classified as:
a. Masqueraders - to the machine these are
internal users indistinguishable from authorized users.
An external penetrator who has gained access to
someone's account is a masquerader, as is an authorized
user who operates under another user's account.
b. Legitimate Users - sometimes known as
misfeasors, these users abuse their authorized access
to the computer system and its data. For instance, a
user with authorized access to highly classified
documents might use a covert channel to convey the
contents of the documents to someone who does not have
access to them. Many experts feel that the legitimate
user is probably the most common computer system
intruder or abuser.
c. Clandestine Users - these users are ones who
have or can seize supervisory control and can thus
operate below the level of auditing or can evade the
auditing such as by turning off the audit function.
Donn Parker's and Peter Neumann's SRI Computer Abuse
Methods Model describes a more comprehensive classification
of eight computer abuses [Neum88a]
:
1. External Abuse - passive (to the computer) actions
such as eavesdropping, physical waste scavenging,
visual spying, espionage, multi-person collusions.
These terms are used in the ordinary sense.
2. Hardware Abuse - generally computer-active actions
such as equipment theft or damage, tapping of the
communication bus, Trojan horse installation,
electromagnetic interference. A Trojan horse is "a
computer program with an apparently or actually useful
function that contains additional (hidden) functions
that surreptitiously exploit the legitimate
authorizations of the invoking process to the detriment
of security." [DoD85]
3. Masquerading - such as impersonation, password
attacks, piggybacking, playback and spoofing attacks,
telephone network weaving to hide dial-up origin and
tail-gating. Password attacks are a user's attempt to
login to another's account by guessing at or otherwise
deriving (such as by random generation) the victim's
password. Piggy-backing occurs when a wire-tapper
is able to append his/her own data to a legitimate
transmission as it passes by on the wire. Playback and
spoofing involve the capturing of a legitimate
transmission. Telephone network weaving refers to a
user who remotely accesses a computer via a telephone
line and proceeds from there to remotely access one or
more other systems until his/her point of dial-up
origin is obscured and is undiscernable to the
destination system. Tail-gating refers to a process's
ability to be accidentally or intentionally attached to
an incompletely deallocated resource.
4. Preparation for deferred abuse - such as the planting
of Trojan horses and viruses. A virus is a special
type of Trojan horse that propagates itself through a
system or network of systems [Cohe84]
.
5. Bypass of intended controls - such as acquisition of
unauthorized privileges, unintended reading, writing,
or copying, integrity violations, trap-doors, covert
channel exploitation. A trap door is "a hidden
software or hardware mechanism that permits system
protection mechanisms to be circumvented reliably and
without detection." The trap door is activated by a
special command or key sequence [Gass88]
,
[DoD85]
.
6. Passive abuse - such as browsing, inference, data
aggregation, activity monitoring. Browsing is a random
searching through other user's or system directories.
Inference refers to a user's deriving, from several
facts he/she has gathered, some form of information
to which he/she would not normally have access. Data
aggregation is accomplished by one or more persons who
obtain data at their appropriate classification levels
and then combine the data such that the combined data
requires a higher classification than the individual
parts. Activity monitoring refers to the notion of
studying the activity patterns (command usage, program
execution, etc.) of a user or group of users in an
attempt to derive information about that user or group.
7. Active abuse - misuse of conferred authority, false
or erroneous data entry, denials of service, computer
network weaving, and worm attacks. Computer network
weaving is similar to telephone network weaving in that
the user covers his/her login or access trail so that
the computer system does not know the user's point of
origin. A worm attack is accomplished by a program
which lies dormant in a system until there is
sufficient available resources for it to run. A worm
program can steal CPU resources and possibly result in
a denial of service.
8. Use as an aid to committing a crime or other misdeed -
such as using one computer to aid in penetrating
another or using a computer to run an illegal drug
business
.
It is worth noting that not all computer threats are
intentional. Certain accidental misuses of the computer
system can also have harmful consequences. Such accidental
misuse could include system personnel mistakes which can
effect all users or user mistakes which result in denial of
service to others [Neum88b]
.
By assimilating information from a wide range of
computer crime reports, Allan Clyde [Clyd87] described five
basic categories of damage a computer system sponsor may
suffer due to computer abuse:
1. Denial of Service - the system becomes inoperable and
unusable for some or all users.
2. Information Loss - information managed by the system
is destroyed or corrupted.
3. Disinformation - information that is made to be
misleading.
4. Information Compromise - information is provided to
persons not authorized to receive it.
5. Resource Exploitation - the system is used to promote
objectives not authorized by the sponsor.
Each of these threat or abuse classifications [Ande80]
,
[Neum88a]
,
[Clyd88] is an attempt to define the many problem
areas faced by computer security. A comparison of these
classifications underscores the fact that the abuses are not
always easily classified. Neumann notes that threat
categories are not necessarily discreet divisions but
instead should be viewed in terms of what damage the
intruder might cause and how intrusions might be
differentiated for detection [Neum88a] . Interestingly, he
points out that certain differentiations between threats are
probably moot in respect to the fact that the damage is
done:
1. External and internal penetrations — once an external
penetrator is in, he becomes an internal threat.
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2. Unauthorized and authorized users -- except for
recording failed login attempts, the computer does not
know the difference.
3. Masquerader and legitimate user — the masquerader
could be an insider or an outsider.
4. Trusted and untrusted users — these cannot be relied
upon as inpenetrable barriers.
1.2 RELEVANT RESEARCH
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS's) are still an
emerging area of computer security, but some serious
research in security audit trail analysis has been developed
in the past few years. Most Intrusion Detection System
implementations are in the experimental stage though there
are a few limited analysis tools on the commercial market
[Lunt88b]
,
[Clyd87] and at least one in the U.S. Federal
Government [Hann88]
. This section gives a brief description
of some of the major research developments but does not
attempt to cover all the valuable experimental supporting
research.
J. P. ANDERSON CO.
In 1980, James Anderson concluded a study of security
audit trails and the role they play in detecting computer
abuses [Ande80]
.
As mentioned in the previous section, he
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classified the different general threats to computer
security and for each he offered some possible methods of
detecting these threats by analyzing the security audit
trail. Of particular significance, he points out that
actions by a masquerader constitute an "extra" use of the
system. This use would probably be abnormal with respect
to the proper user's normal past behavior and could probably
be noticed by analysis of audit records.
The Intrusion Detection Model
Anderson's hypothesis, and a great deal of experimental
research at Sytek and at the Stanford Research Institute
(SRI) International, formed the basis for SRI ' s Intrusion
Detection Model [Denn85]
,
[Denn87] . This model is meant to
provide a framework for a general intrusion detection system
which is independent, both physically and logically, of the
system it is analyzing (the target system) . The model is a
rule-based pattern matching system. In short, audit records
from the target system are matched against statistical
profiles of user behavior which are learned by the Intrusion
Detection Expert System (IDES) . If the current behavior as
shown in the audit record exceeds an established threshold
of the profile, an anomaly is generated and the system
security officer is alerted in real-time.
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The model consists of six main components:
1. Subjects: Initiators of activity on a target
system - normally users.
2. Objects: Resources managed by the system -
files, commands, devices, etc.
3. Audit Records: Generated by the target system
in response to actions performed or attempted by
subjects on objects - user login, command
execution, file access, etc. [See figure 1.1]
4. Profiles: Structures that characterize the
behavior of subjects with respect to objects in
terms of statistical metrics and models of
observed activity. Profiles are automatically
generated and initialized from templates.
5. Anomaly Records: Generated when abnormal
behavior is detected.
6. Activity Rules: Actions taken when some
condition is satisfied, which update profiles,
detect abnormal behavior, relate anomalies to
suspected intrusions, and produce reports.
< Subject, Action, Object, Exception-Condition,
Resource-Usage, Time-Stamp >
Figure 1.1 Audit Record Format.
For efficiency, the audit record format in figure 1.1 is
a standard format recognized by the IDES [Denn85] . The
tuples are:
Subject: the initiator of the recorded action.
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* Action: a single-object operation the subject
performs on the object, e.g., login, logout, read,
write.
* Object: the receptor of the action. Types of objects
are files, programs, messages, terminals, printers,
etc. Subjects can also be objects such as when they
are the receptors of electronic mail.
* Exception-Condition: denotes which, if any,
exception - conditions [errors] are raised on the
return.
* Resource-Usage: list of quantitative elements, where
each element gives the amount used of some resource,
e.g., number of lines or pages printed, number of
records read or written, CPU time or I/O units used,
session elapsed time.
* Time-Stamp: unique time/date stamp of the action.
Formally, the sum of the audit records conceptually
forms an audit matrix which is very similar to an access
matrix [Denn85]
. The state of the target system is defined
by a triple (S,0,A), where:
1. S is the set of subjects . Subjects perform
actions on objects. S£0.
2. is the set of objects . Objects are acted
upon by subjects. Each object is uniquely
identifiable.
3. A is an audit matrix , with rows corresponding
to subjects and columns to objects. An entry
A[S,0] lists the actions that subject S performed
on object 0. Also listed in A[S,0] is the
associated error-conditions and time-stamps of the
14
actions and the cumulative resource usage of the
subject [Denn82]
,
[Denn85]
.
The IDES prototype discussed in the next section
conceptually views the audit matrix from the subject angle
as it generates statistical profiles about the normal
behavior of the subjects. However, it seems reasonable that
one could as easily approach the audit matrix from the
object view so that profiles about the normal usage of
particular objects could be determined. Stated another way,
it should not be significantly more difficult to draw
conclusions about all user's behavior with respect to a
particular object such as a very sensitive file or program.
Denning gives some suggestions on the classes of objects and
the types of measures which should be tracked and analyzed
[Denn85]
.
This idea will be explored further in Chapter 3.
The Intrusion Detection Model (IDM) describes the
processing of audit records, the production of profiles and
the use of the activity rules to determine an intrusion.
The Intrusion Detection Model is the framework for SRI *
s
prototype and enhanced prototype Intrusion Detection Expert
Systems (IDES's) and almost all other subsequent related
research in automated audit trail analysis.
15
IDES
At the forefront of automated audit trail analysis
research, the IDES [Denn87]
,
[Lunt88a]
,
[Lunt88b]
,
[Lunt88c]
,
[Lunt89] is an iterative prototype of a real-time intrusion
detection system developed by a team at SRI. The IDES
monitors a DEC-2065 running a customized (for security
auditing) version of the TOPS-20 operating system. In its
next phase, the IDES will monitor several target systems
simultaneously. The highly sophisticated IDES is composed
of two separate detection entities: Statistical Intrusion
Detection and Rule-based Intrusion Detection (the Expert
System)
.
It is intended that inappropriate behavior will be
detected by one or the other entity, and possibly both.
The Statistical Intrusion Detection component generates
the subject profiles for normal subject behavior and
compares them with new audit record data looking for
significant deviations from the profiles. This strategy is
usually effective in detecting masqueraders and authorized
users who suddenly and suspiciously depart from their
normal behavior, assuming that the authorized user normally
maintains a stable pattern of behavior. If, however, the
subject's behavior is very erratic or too new to have an
accurate, established profile, the Expert System component
may be useful. The Expert System contains rules which
16
characterize intrusions based on knowledge of past
intrusion, known system vulnerabilities and the
installation-specific security policy.
The knowledge-base of the expert system
contains information about known system
vulnerabilities and reported attack scenarios, as
well as our [the developer's] intuition about
suspicious behavior [Lunt89]
.
Thus the rules may be specific to the environment but are
independent of any particular subject's normal behavior.
The Expert System looks for any departures from what it
considers normal behavior for any subject. An example of a
departure from normal behavior is the set number of failed
login attempts by any single user that the monitor allows
before it signals the security officer that someone might be
conducting a password attack.
The IDES monitors three different types of subjects:
users, remote hosts, and target systems. For these
subjects, the IDES monitors 36 different measures . See
figure 1.2. There are two types of measures - categorical
and continuous. The values for each of the measures is used
to create profiles and to update them at the end of each
time segment (for a subject, this could be a user session)
.
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A categorical measure is a function of some
aspect of observed behavior whose range is the set
of all combinations of a finite set of categories.
An example of a categorical measure is the
commands invoked by a user, where the range is all
combinations of file names. Another example is the
hour of activity by a user, where the range is all
combinations of the 24 hours of a day.
A continuous measure is a function of some
aspect of observed behavior whose range is the set
of real numbers. An example of a continuous
measure is the length of a user-session. Another
example is the number of lines printed by a user
during a session [Lunt88a]
.
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User Measures
CPU usage (continuous)
.
Input/output usage (continuous)
Connect time (continuous).
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
3)
9)
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Audit records generated (continuous)
.
Shift of login (categorical)
.
Location of use (categorical)
.
Location change count (continuous)
.
Command usage (categorical)
.
Command usage (binary) (categorical)
Mailer usage (categorical)
.
Editor usage (categorical)
Compiler usage (categorical)
Directory modification (continuous)
.
Directories accessed (categorical)
Directories accessed (binary) (categorical)
.
Errors (continuous)
.
Errors by type (categorical)
.
Hourly use (categorical)
.
Hour of use (binary) (categorical)
.
Day of use (binary) (categorical)
.
Network activity (continuous)
.
Network activity by host (categorical)
.
Network activity by type (categorical)
Hourly network activity (categorical)
.
Hourly network activity by host by type
(categorical)
.
Host Measures
1) Host users (categorical)
.
2) Activity types (categorical)
.
3) Hourly use (categorical)
4) Hourly use by type (categorical)
.
5) Bad login attempts (continuous)
.
6) Hourly bad login attempts (categorical)
System Measures
1) Bad login attempts (continuous)
.
2) Hourly bad login attempts (categorical)
3) System errors (continuous)
.
4) System errors by type (categorical)
.
5) Hourly system errors (categorical)
.
Figure 1.2 The measures used in the IDES. [Lunt88a]
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A subject profile consists of four components:
1) Effective Count Vector (Effn) - this holds the count of
the number of time segments (i.e. user sessions) for
each measure for that subject.
2) Mean Vector (Mean (x) ) - this contains the historical
mean value for each measure, x, for the subject.
3) Covariance Matrix - the values in this matrix inter-
relate all the measures observed for that subject. The
elements are determined by:
n
Cov(x,y) = l/n(^ v; (x) v,-(y)) - Mean(x) Mean(y).
where x and y are measures, v; (x) and Vj (y) are values
for the ith time segment of the measures under
consideration and n = min(Effn(x), Effn(y)).
4) Inverse of the Covariance Matrix.
Anomaly detection is performed for all subjects as each
audit record arrives. The statistical procedure of the
IDES evaluates whether a particular observed measure value
deviates relative to the observed values for all the other
measures, not just with respect to that measure considered
independently. To accomplish this, the IDES uses a
Composite Test:
t2 = (X - X) C~' (X-X)X
where X is the continuous measure vector for a user's
session, X is the mean vector from the user's profile and C~'
20
is the inverse covariance matrix also from the user's
profile. An anomaly exists if the value of t2 falls outside
the 95% probability range of its distribution. Anomalies
are reported through a sophisticated security officer
interface. Using the interface the security officer has
many options such as monitoring activity at the user-session
level, making direct queries to the IDES database, and
customizing the various parameters used to control how the
IDES monitors subjects (such as the number of failed login
attempts allowed)
.
Audit
The Audit system was developed by Clyde Digital Systems
[Clyd87] who classify it as an Insider Threat Identification
System founded on (1) internal system surveillance. The
other four basic components are: (2) analysis of the
surveillance data by an expert system, (3) identification
of perpetrators using the expert system, (4) tools for
detailed damage assessments and (5) support capability for
recovery. The Audit system monitors VAX/VMS machines. The
surveillance system captures all user interaction with the
system and uses 14 risk factor tests to identify high-risk
users and record their activity.
21
MIDAS
The Multics Intrusion Detection and Alerting System
(MIDAS) is a real-time rule-based Intrusion Detection System
developed at the National Computer Security Center (NCSC)
.
MIDAS monitors activity on the NCSC ' s networked mainframe,
DOCKMASTER, a Honeywell DPS-8/70 Multics System [Hann88]
Its auditing components exist on the target machine while
its knowledge bases
, statistical database and system
security officer interface are installed on a separate
Symbolics Lisp machine. The MIDAS rulebase contains three
types of heuristics used to analyze the audit data for
intrusions:
* Immediate Attack - these represent a priori rules about
what constitutes an intrusion.
* User Anomaly - these make use of statistical profiles
of user behavior.
* System State - these also use statistical profiles to
characterize behavior of the entire system.
The MIDAS system is currently in operation at the NCSC and
continues to be improved.
TACAUD
The Network Auditing Usage Reporting System (NAURS)
operates with the Terminal Access Controller (TAC) Access
22
Control System for the ARPANET and MILNET [Lunt88b],
[Neum89]
.
The ARPANET was created by ARPA, now DARPA, the
(Defense) Advanced Research Projects Agency of the U.S.
Department of Defense. MILNET, a military network, was
established later using the ARPANET technology. The TAC
auditor (TACAUD) runs on the NAURS system and monitors
network usage initiated from TAC ' s such as logins, logouts,
connects and disconnects to the hosts. Note that TACAUD
monitors terminal connections to a host, but does not
monitor subsequent TELNET (remote) connections from that
host to other hosts. Therefore, the monitoring system can
effectively lose track of a user's activity on the network.
The nature of this problem is discussed further in Chapter
2. Individual hosts monitor their own usage. The system
is currently rule-based though statistical profiling may
be added in the future.
Network Security Monitor
The Network Security Monitor (NSM) is a product of on-
going research at the University of California at Davis and
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory [Mans88]
. Goals of
this research are to identify vulnerabilities created by
connecting computers into networks and how exploitation of
these vulnerabilities might best be identified. The NSM is
concerned with the misuse of the information packets which
23
are flowing around the network. Some of the identified
threats are: rerouting of packets; data modification
within the packets; packet delay; flooding/jamming;
imitation by altering the source address of the packet. The
NSM places packet catchers on each separate network line to
monitor the traffic. The current model runs on a Sun
workstation and monitors an Ethernet LAN. Currently under
consideration is the question of what granularity levels of
monitoring are most effective for detecting intrusions.
While this relatively new field of intrusion detection
has seen a flurry of activity in developing audit analysis
tools for both government and commercial use, there are
still many open questions and needs for future research. Of
the several examples given in this section, almost all rely
heavily upon Anderson's hypothesis about abnormal behavior
and on Denning
' s Intrusion Detection Model. For simplicity,
we will refer to all systems of this type as Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDS's). The current IDS's all monitor
single systems. An important open question is that of how
to apply the Intrusion Detection Model to a network of
interconnected computer systems. This research provides a
model of network intrusion detection and a framework for its
continued study.
24
1.3 RESEARCH GOALS
In approaching the problems associated with monitoring
events on a network of interconnected computer systems, one
must first understand how a network differs from a single
system and how these differences can benefit an intruder.
One major difference is that a user on one machine has the
potential to access information, execute programs or
otherwise manipulate system components on all the other
machines of the network. This issue and others will be
discussed in Chapter 2, The Problem. Following in Chapter
3, The Network Monitor Model, is a description of our
approach to handling those issues. Included is the
description of a two level Network Monitor Model which
monitors at the LAN and at the internet levels. This
chapter also discusses a problem of the statistical model
suggested by Denning
' s Intrusion Detection Model and
currently used in some intrusion detection implementations
and suggests a different statistical approach. Chapter 4,
Results and Conclusions, presents the significant findings
of this research and suggests direction for future study in
this area.
As mentioned earlier, because no published research has
yet undertaken the complex task of monitoring a network for
intrusion detection, there were no pre-conceived ideas on
25
how this should best be done. Thus, the goal of this
research was to develop a valid, generalized approach and
framework for continued study in network intrusion
detection. Included in this framework is a proposed two-
level Network Monitor Model and several specific issues
identified for further study. The Network Monitor Model is
intended to be general enough that it can be applied to any
size and type of network, possibly even extending the two-
level model into three or more levels as dictated by the
network topography.
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CHAPTER 2
THE PROBLEM: INTRUSION DETECTION ON NETWORKS
2 . INTRODUCTION
Current knowledge of how to automatically analyze audit
data for a single site system provides some degree of
protection; however, it is not enough to consider a single
system in isolation. In general, the organizations with the
most need for information security are those with a great
need for interaction among their sub-units and with external
sources as well. As intercommunication among computer
systems can only be expected to increase in the future, ways
must be found to detect insecurities on connected systems.
When two or more computer systems are connected by a
cable, switched telephone line or satellite, in theory a
user on one system gains access to all of the computing
power and resources in the network. Security policies need
to be adopted to control interaction between connected
computer systems; auditing can help to ensure enforcement
of these policies. However, the concept of auditing and the
analysis of the audit data collected becomes increasingly
27
more complex proportional to the size and complexity of the
monitored network. In this research, we apply Denning'
s
Intrusion Detection Model [Denn87] to all types of networks,
whether they are local area networks (LAN's) , sets of
connected LAN's known as wide area networks (WAN's) or some
other variation of connected systems. This problem is not
merely a trivial expansion or multiplication of the current
monitoring tools such as those described in [Lunt88b]
,
[Hann88] and [Clyd87] . Intercommunication between connected
systems adds another, more complex, dimension to the
intrusion detection model. The purpose of this chapter is
to address some of the more significant issues encountered
in applying intrusion detection methods to a network
environment
.
Section 2.1 presents a basic overview of networks and
their terminology. Section 2.2 discusses some of the
problems of monitoring a network with Intrusion Detection
Systems. Section 2.3 describes the problems of monitoring a
system having remote file access, remote file transfer and
remote login facilities. Section 2.4 discusses the problem
of collusion in regard to network intrusion detection.
Finally, section 2.5 presents our approach to the problem of
monitoring networks.
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2 . 1 NETWORKS
A computer is defined as any device capable of storing
and processing information and of communicating with other
computers if linked by a network [Walk85]. A computer
network is defined as an interconnected collection of
autonomous computers [Tann88] . Interconnected here means
that there exists no master/slave relation between any two
computers of the network. We will often refer to
communicating computers on a network as hosts .
A computer network differs from a distributed system in
that the user must normally deal explicitly with different
hosts on the network whereas in a distributed system, the
existence of multiple processors is transparent to the user
[Tann88]
.
The hosts of a network are connected by a communication
subnet which can be one of two basic types [Tann88]
:
1) Point-to-Point channels. In this case,
messages (packets) are passed in their entirety
from one intermediate computer (switch) to another
until they reach their destination. This is also
known as packet-switched
.
Almost all wide area
networks are of this type.
2) Broadcast channels. In this case, there is
just one communication channel shared by all the
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hosts of the network. Packets broadcast are
received by all hosts but are discarded by those
that are not the intended recipients. Most local
area networks are of this type.
Network Architecture
Most networks are organized into a hierarchy of layers
each of which provides a service to the layer above it. The
provision of services between any two layers is proscribed
by a set of rules and conventions collectively known as a
protocol
. A commonly used layered network model is the
International Standards Organization (ISO) Open Systems
Interconnection (OSI) Reference Model shown in figure 2.1.
Cryptography, an important part of computer security,
is often handled by the presentation layer. The auditing
which we will refer to in this research will likely be
accomplished at the network layer.
Types of Networks
There are significant differences between local area
networks (LAN's) and wide area networks (WAN's) or other
types of internets with regard to developing an intrusion
detection system. Local area networks consist of connected
systems (hosts) and other peripheral devices physically
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located within a relatively small area ,e.g. a building.
Each of the components of a LAN can be subject to the
control of a central authority which establishes and
enforces the security policies of the LAN. A department of
a large company or university may be allocated a LAN.
Several of these LANs may be connected at the Data Link
layer by a relay called a bridge or a gateway . This
configuration is known as an internet . The term internet
describes any collection of two or more packet-switched
networks interconnected by gateways plus the protocols which
enable the networks to function logically as one large
network. The Internet is an internet operated by DARPA
which uses the TCP/IP protocols
.
[Come88]
A WAN is a type of internet that is characterized by
great physical distances between its components. These
components are normally LANs but may be individual hosts.
The components of a WAN are connected by gateways which are
specialized computers that operate at the Network Layer to
enable messages to pass between heterogeneous LANs and
hosts. A WAN is often a more loosely coupled network whose
member LANs may be dissimilar and unrelated. Further, there
may be no central authority over the WAN other than for
network administration purposes and consequently no common
security policies or means of enforcing those policies.
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It is projected that the Intrusion Detection Expert
System (IDES) being developed at SRI is capable of
monitoring audit data from more than one target system at a
time. [Lunt88a] In the IDES model, each system performs its
own audit functions and then passes standard format audit
records to the physically separate and independent IDES.
This may be feasible if the IDES treats each system's data
separately, as if each system logically had its own IDES.
Both for physical and logical reasons, one can not expect
one intrusion detection system to monitor all of the systems
on a network of interconnected LANs. If we apply the IDES
concept to a WAN we can visualize an internet of LANs in
which each LAN has a dedicated Intrusion Detection System
(IDS)
.
Each LAN is then responsible for enforcing and
monitoring its own security policies irrespective of any
other system with which it communicates. Likewise, any
individual host which communicates directly with a WAN
conceptually would have its own IDS. In this model the
IDS's do not communicate with one another. A proposed
monitored internet is shown in figure 2.2.
2.2 MULTIPLE IDS's ON A SINGLE NETWORK
If a single intrusion detection system is to be able to
effectively process the audit data generated by several
target machines, there are at least two important unresolved
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Figure 2.2 A Proposed IDS-Monitored Internet Configuration.
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issues to consider:
(1) How many target systems should one IDS monitor?
(2) How to handle multiple instances of user profiles?
In regard to the first issue, for the purposes of this
paper, we will assume that each LAN is monitored by a single
Intrusion Detection System.
Multiple Instances of User Profiles
Because each LAN is monitored by a single IDS, we will
further assume that each IDS is completely independent of
the others. Each IDS maintains its own databases of
statistical profiles, short-term user data, and expert
system rules and knowledge. This is critical to the
security of the IDS databases whose contents must be
protected from unauthorized alteration and from unauthorized
disclosure of personal information. Therefore, as opposed
to considering any type of distributed monitoring, each IDS
would maintain its own databases of statistical profiles,
short-term user data, and expert system rules and knowledge.
Independent IDSs lead to a problem — the existance of
multiple profiles for the same subject (or object).
Suppose, for example, that a subject owns accounts on more
than one system and that at least one of those systems is
monitored by a different IDS than the others. Each of these
35
IDSs would have a statistical profile of that user
representing his/her actions with respect to the target
systems that the IDS is monitoring. Each IDS would have no
knowledge of the subject's profiles which exist on the other
IDS's.
A subject may use the existance of these profiles, and
the fact that the IDSs do not communicate among themselves,
in an attempt to confuse the audit analysis. For instance,
if a subject works within the limits of his/her various
individual profiles on different machines, no reportable
anomalies of any consequence are detected. But subjects may
be able to commit abuse over the collective work done on all
the systems. Two areas in which subjects could create this
type of confusion are:
(1) remote access
(2) collusion
These areas will be covered in the following sections.
2.3 REMOTE ACCESS
Processes can communicate between machines on a network
by using remote access calls and file transfer protocols.
These forms of communication have the potential for a
subject to abuse the systems. A subject is able to be logged
into one system and by using a remote system call may
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execute commands and perform functions such as reading and
copying files on a remote system without directly logging
into it. This description is characteristic of the UNIX
operating system although we assume most other operating
systems provide some other similar form of remote system
calls. Throughout the remainder of this paper, all
references to operating system features will be based on the
UNIX system because this is the one with which we are most
familiar. Most of the information regarding UNIX commands
was taken from [UNIX86] . A problem is that the IDS
monitoring the remote system is unaware of the original
source or of the subject profile in the original source
environment. Three classes of remote calls which are
susceptible to this problem are:
(1) remote login
(2) remote shell
(3) file transfer
Remote Login
With a remote login service, a user is able to log onto
another system from the system which he/she is already
logged onto if the user is authorized to use the remote
system. In the UNIX systems there are two programs to
accomplish remote login: rlogin and telnet. An example of
each command usage is given in figure 2.3. Using the rlogin
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command, the user must explicitly execute the login process
on the remote machine. Once successfully logged in, the
user's shell is invoked, the user is allocated a pseudo-
terminal and can function as though the login was local.
Shell is a term refering to a command interpreter process
which is created at login for each user. A pseudo-terminal
describes the operating system entry point that allows a
running program like the TELNET and rlogin servers to
simulate a terminal [Come88] . Although the user's input is
actually originating at the source host, it is being
propagated through the pseudo-terminal to the remote host
for execution. The user can continue to issue remote login
commands from a remote login allowing the situation
illustrated in figure 2.4.
(a) % rlogin machine2
(b) % telnet machine2
Figure 2.3 Examples of the UNIX rlogin and telnet commands.
mosfpakj/w©^
Figure 2.4 The Result of Successive Remote Logins
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From a terminal at host A, the user can list files on
system D for example. The command originates at A, emanates
thru B and C and finally executes at D, while the output
follows the same path in reverse. Events are audited at
each system based on what that system knows about the
transaction, the user and the system status. In the UNIX
environment, as well as several other operating systems,
each host only knows about the host that logged into it,
not any host previous to that login. Host C knows that B
issued a remote login, but does not know that the user is
actually originating from A. One can imagine that several
remote logins over a large WAN, for example, would
effectively cover the trail of a possible intruder making
detection and apprehension very difficult. This problem
would be greatly compounded if some of the logins were
authorized and some were masquerades.
Referring to figure 2.4, consider Intrusion Detection
Systems that are monitoring the systems. Each contains a
profile of the user that pertains only to that user's
behavior on that system. Conceivably, from a terminal at A,
the user could cause an event to occur on D with no ill
effects while that same event if it occurred on A would have
caused an anomaly. This is because the event described
behavior that was in keeping with the user's (or the
group's or system's) profile on D. The user could use the
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knowledge that A and D (and B and C) profile him differently
and thus each expects different behavior. A simplistic
example of this problem can be depicted as follows:
1) User T's profile of his behavior on machine K
"allows" him to print 1500 lines per session before the
threshold is exceeded and an anomaly is reported by the IDES.
2) User T's profile of his behavior on machine H
"allows" him to print 3500 lines per session before
indicating an anomaly.
3) Machine K and machine H are on separate, but
connected LAN's which are monitored by different IDS's.
4) User T wishes to print out a file containing 3350
lines without raising an anomaly or attracting suspicion.
Therefore, user T logs into machine K, remotely logs into
machine H and prints the file. The IDES at machine H does
not note any unusual behavior regarding the printing.
Machine K merely notes a remote login to H but is not aware
of the printing. Thus user T has performed a function at K
which normally would have resulted in an anomaly but which
goes unnoticed in this case.
A further complication of this scenario would result if
the user at A chose to print information contained in D on
printers located at B and C. Suppose that the user at A
wished to perform an action like this which would not fall
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within the thresholds of the user's profile or that of the
user's group at A. If the user knows that the action would
fit the individual or group profile at D, the user could
perform the action at D from the remote system A. The user
could also provide this information to others at B and C
with functions such as remote file transfer or remote shell.
Remote Shell
Rsh (remote shell) , a variation of the rlogin program,
is very similar in that it allows the user to execute a
command on a remote machine or system. However, unlike
remote login, the user never explicitly logs onto the remote
system. The user's shell on the remote machine is invoked
and therefore all the user's actions on the remote machine
can be audited and properly attributed to him/her. The user
can execute a single command sequence which upon execution
completion at the remote host returns the user to the
originating shell. It is important to note that
control is not returned to the local shell until the remote
command has terminated. This point may become important
when using time-event ordering to determine a remote user's
point of origin as we suggest in Chapter 4. Because rsh does
not prompt for a password, it can be used in programs as
well as from the keyboard. Figure 2.5 gives an example of
the rsh command usage.
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% rsh machine2 Is
Figure 2.5 This example of rsh would list (Is) all
the files in the user's home directory
which resides on a different machine than
the one the user is logged into.
Here again, the user can issue successive remote shell
commands so that he/she is effectively working on a machine
several systems removed and thereby greatly confuse the
system as to his/her true disposition. See the example in
figure 2.6.
% rsh machine2 rlogin machinel
Figure 2.6 This command would log the user back onto
the machine from which he/she is issuing
the command.
File Transfer
File Transfer programs allow the user to copy files
from one host machine to another on the network. The UNIX
operating systems contains several different forms of this
type command: rep, uucp and FTP. The rep (remote copy)
command requires that the local user name must exist on the
remote host and allow remote command execution via rsh
(remote shell)
. This command is capable of handling third
party copies where neither the source nor target files are
42
on the current machine [UNIX86] . See the example in figure
2.7. FTP (File Transfer Protocol) is an Internet protocol
that allows authorized users to log into a remote system,
list remote directories, copy files to or from the remote
machine, and execute a few simple commands remotely. FTP is
more complex than TELNET in that it uses the TELNET protocol
for its control connection, it allows a user to access
multiple machines in a single FTP session and it maintains
separate TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) connections for
control and data transfer. FTP was designed to be used by
programs but can also be used directly by users. Like rep,
FTP can also handle third party file transfers [Come88].
UUCP (Unix to Unix Copy Program) allows one UNIX system to
copy files to or from another UNIX system over a single
(usually dial-up) line.
% rep machine2:file2 machine3 : f ile3
Figure 2.7 An example of copying a file between two
machines from a third machine (machinel)
using rep.
To further complicate the situation, any of the three
types of remote access commands (remote login, remote shell
and file transfer) can be used in combination to cause
considerable confusion for any audit trail monitor. The key
problem involving these remote access capabilities is that
there is a great potential for the Intrusion Detection
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Systems to become confused about the actual location, time
or even the object of a subject's action thus resulting in
an incorrect assessment of the normality of the behavior.
2.4 COLLUSION
Collusion is a secret agreement or cooperation for a
fraudulent or deceitful purpose [Merr74] . Specifically we
refer to collusion of efforts between two or more subjects
who are attempting to gain unauthorized access to
information by pooling their accessing abilities. For
example, if two subjects are each authorized access to two
different portions of a statistical database, they might be
able to combine the information they each can legally
extract to form a tracker with which they can illegally
obtain details about specific entries in the database. The
problem of collusion, though, is not limited to databases.
Several subjects could agree to use their systems as a ruse
in order to confuse the monitors and draw attention away
from an actual intrusion. Or, they could all cooperate to
flood the network with auditable events and effectively
cause a denial of service condition.
Closely related to collusion between subjects is the
problem of information aggregation . One or more users can
obtain data which is classified at a level appropriate to
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their clearances and combine this information such that the
compilation of knowledge should actually require a higher
security classification or protection than do the individual
data elements [Vaug88]
.
Collusion Classification
While there are infinitely many possible varieties of
collusion or information aggregation between intruders, we
recognize four possible scenarios which would determine
classifications of collusion attempts as they are monitored
by an IDS:
(1) All intruders working on the same host.
(2) All intruders working at the same site (LAN)
but on different hosts.
(3) One intruder who works from multiple hosts
on the same or different LANs (information
aggregation)
.
(4) Two or more intruders working from multiple
hosts on different LANs.
The problem here is that the would be intruders are
taking advantage of the fact that their dispersed activity
is being monitored by different intrusion detection systems.
Individually, their activities may not violate the
thresholds of their user profiles and no anomalies will be
reported. However, together these "colluders" are able to
aggregate their information to gain knowledge which would
have caused an anomaly if sought by an individual. The
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results of this concept are very similar to the remote
access problem, although we may be more successful in
detecting and deterring intrusion by remote access than in
detecting collusion. The one scenario in which we feel we
have the best chance of detecting collusion is that of (3)
,
one subject working from multiple hosts on the same or
different LANs. Of course, if this scenario were clouded
by numerous remote access calls, detection could become very
complex.
2.5 THE PROBLEM APPROACH
The architecture and design approach presented in the
following chapter considers the problems of monitoring in
the network environment. Using the Access Matrix Model, the
problem is approached at two levels, the local (LAN) level
and the global (WAN) level. The approach is also from a
somewhat different perspective than that of previously
published research [Lunt88b]
, [Hann88] , [Clyd87]
.
When a system in our model collects audit data, it is
in effect forming a three-dimensional table which has a
structure very similar to the Access Matrix Model
[Denn82]
,
[Denn85]
. We will call this table an Audit Data
Matrix (ADM). The indices of the ADM are subjects, objects
and time. Entries into the table are events, the operations
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performed by the subjects on the objects.
The first level of our Network Monitor Model, the Local
Area Network Intrusion Detection System (LAN-IDS) , will draw
on data from the subject view of the ADM. Using this data,
it will construct subject profiles for all the users of the
systems in that LAN. This is congruent to the approach of
existing IDS prototypes as discussed in Chapter 1. The LAN-
IDS should be capable of detecting most of the intrusions on
the LAN which it monitors when those intrusions originate
from within that LAN. More complex intrusions such as those
involving remote accesses from outside the LAN will probably
be detected with the aid of the second level of our model.
The second level of our Network Monitor Model, the
Global Object Monitor, will draw on data from both the
subject and object views of the ADM which will be supplied
by the target systems both on the LANs and as individual
hosts. The Global Object Monitor will construct combined
object profiles for selected sensitive objects of the
internet as well as combined subject profiles. The object
profiles will be based upon the same concept as the subject
profiles but will be derived from somewhat different
measures. The Global Object Monitor will have a 'total
picture' of the network. By combining the total picture
with the object profiling, the Global Object Monitor will
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have the ability to detect some of the intrusions which
would not be evident at the LAN-IDS level. A
conceptualization of this approach is given in figure 2.8.
SYSTCm
Figure 2.8 The Network Intrusion Detection Monitor Concept
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CHAPTER 3
A NETWORK MONITOR MODEL
3 . INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter discussed some of the problems of
monitoring activity on networks. In this chapter, we
present a model for monitoring networks which consist of
interconnected Local Area Networks (LAN's).
An underlying premise of the model is that LAN's and
large internets of connected LAN's behave differently and
therefore will have different monitor requirements. Our
Network Intrusion Detection Model provides for monitors at
two levels of the network. The Local Area Network Intrusion
Detection System (LAN-IDS) will monitor the activity of a
single target system or two or more systems connected as a
LAN. The second level of intrusion detection will be
handled by the Global Object Monitor (GOM) which will
oversee the collective activity of an internet or Wide Area
Network (WAN)
.
The Network Intrusion Detection System Model
can be conceptualized as shown in figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1. The Network Monitor Model
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The two levels of monitors differ in their objectives,
their composition and their capabilities. Each of these
differences will be discussed in this chapter. While the
LAN-IDS can be considered a complete self-contained monitor
for a LAN, the GOM is sustained by input from the LAN-IDS 's
and complements their capabilities in order to provide a
more secure network.
A general description of the network monitor model is
given in section 3.1. Section 3.2 contains some comments on
the statistical model used in Denning 's Intrusion Detection
Model. Some suggested object measures which should be
monitored are given in section 3.3. Sections 3.4 and 3.5
provide descriptions of the two different levels of
monitors. We make the following assumptions concerning the
networks
:
ASSUMPTION 3.1: Each operating system running on
the network has an adequate audit capability which
records all security relevant events (see
Definition 3.0) as dictated by the network
controller (see Definition 3.1).
ASSUMPTION 3.2: On each system, it will be
possible to determine the source system of a
remote access.
ASSUMPTION 3.3: Each operating system running on
the network has adequate cryptography capabilities
to encrypt all communication from them to their
LAN-IDS' s.
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3.1 A GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL
A conceptualization of the two-level network monitor
model was given in figure 3.1. The two levels of the model
are meant to work together to detect any breaches of the
security policies of each of the LAN's as well as the
security policy of the interconnected network. The greatest
responsibility for intrusion detection lies with the LAN-IDS
while the GOM attempts to detect those intrusions which
elude the capabilities of the LAN-IDS 's.
Each LAN or separate host on the WAN is monitored by a
LAN-IDS. The LAN-IDS monitors all the systems on the LAN in
much the same way that the SRI IDES prototype monitors a
single system. A key difference is that in addition to
monitoring subject (i.e. user) behavior, the LAN-IDS
amalgamates the audit data from all the separate systems and
detects intrusive behavior which transgresses system
boundaries. It does this by forming composite profiles for
all subjects and for certain exceptional objects, such as
those objects with existing copies on more than one system
of the network. The need to monitor objects as well as
subjects was first mentioned in [Ande80] and was later
discussed in greater detail in [Denn85] . Because the set of
objects within a system may vary often and may grow to great
proportions, it would be impractical to try to profile every
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object. This is different from the set of subjects, such as
users, who's size is controlled by the system administrator.
The choices of the exceptional objects and the relevant
events associated with those objects are dictated by the
network security policy of the network controller. Some of
the possible object choices would be highly sensitive
files, critical databases or employee payroll records.
DEFINITION 3.1: RELEVENT EVENT. A relevant event
for auditing is that subject activity upon an
object which corresponds to a measure used in the
object's profile. An example is a read of an
object if that object were being profiled and one
of the contributing measures was the total number
of reads of that object.
DEFINITION 3.2: NETWORK CONTROLLER. For this
research we consider a LAN or WAN network
controller to be the network owner or body of
authority over all aspects of network usage to
include security policy, communication protocol,
network configuration, etc.
Besides detecting unusual subject behavior, as is now
done by the IDES, the LAN-IDS notes an anomaly when it
detects any significant deviation from the normal use of an
object. Use in this context refers to any of the actions
of which an object is the recipient, i.e. read, write,
execute, etc. For example, if a highly sensitive database
is suddenly accessed 50% more often in a day than usual,
this would obviously constitute an abnormal use of that
database.
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The GOM provides the additional support necessary at
the WAN level by merging subject and object profile data
from all the interconnnected LAN's and individual hosts.
There is only one GOM for a WAN. It will necessarily
process very large volumes of data and therefore the model
does not attempt to detect intrusive behavior in real-time,
unlike the LAN-IDS. This is acceptable in view of the
different detection objectives of the GOM. The GOM receives
all its input from the LAN-IDS in batches at regular
intervals, possibly once per day during non-peak hours. The
GOM will construct composite profiles of all subjects and of
the most critical objects present in the network and will
attempt to determine abusive behavior which results from
such tactics as collusion, data aggregation and computer
weaving as discussed in Chapter 2.
3.2 A COMMENT ON STATISTICAL ANOMALY DETECTION
As described in Chapter 1, Denning's Intrusion
Detection Model and the IDES employ a variation of the mean
and standard deviation statistical model and Chebyshev's
inequality. This variation places greater weights on more
recent values (by applying a decay factor to the data) and
considers the correlations among the different measures.
This method has detected anomalous behavior with acceptable
false positive rates as reported by SRI [Lunt88a]
. However,
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this statistical method may not be the best choice [McNu89]
.
If the measured behavior values, such as a user's behavior,
is always distributed normally about the mean and each
behavior value is independent of any of the previous values
then the mean and standard deviation model could be an
appropriate method to use in detecting unusual behavior.
However, it seems very unlikely that a user's behavior
pattern would be normally distributed and it seems much more
likely that each user action would indeed be influenced by
other actions which had previously occured. Therefore, any
statistical test for deviant behavior should not look at the
current behavior as an isolated situation but instead should
consider the current behavior in relation to recent past
behavior by the same user.
Denning 's choice of methods seems to be based on the
assumption that the behaviors as recorded in the audit
records are discrete events independent of the previous
events and the order and time of their occurance. This
method is depicted in figure 3.2.
Even if we do assume that a user's behavior represents
a normal distribution, there are two problems with this
model as it is used for anomaly detection:
1) The possibility of an excessive false positive
rate, i.e. finding acceptable behavior to be anomalous.
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This equates to a Type I error if we take the Null
Hypothesis to be the user's historical mean behavior.
2) The greater possibility of producing false
negatives. That is, failing to determine that an activity
is anomalous, a Type II error.
The chance of producing false positives increases as the
distribution of a user's activity moves away from the bell
shape [McNu89]
.
mean
wt
Figure 3.2. User behavior using the mean and standarddeviation model. Activity falling above the dashed line is
considered anomalous. The curve represents the user'sprofile; the dashed lines represent the region within which
the standard deviation of the behavior over time should fall
with a probability determined by Chebyshev
' s inequality.
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A better solution to these problems might be a time-
series statistical model. A Time-Series is the "data
available for the development of a forecast" . . . "in the
form of a sequence of dated observations." [Vatt78] These
observations are made at regular intervals of time on the
variable to be forecast. A time series of past values can
be decomposed into component factors (i.e. the relative
effect of cyclical factors, the effect of seasonal factors,
the effect of unexplained variations, etc.). These
components are then extrapolated into the future to form the
basis (through recombination) for a probabilistic forecast
[Vatt78]
.
A user's past behavior would be used to forecast
his/her behavior that we could expect to see in the future.
Applying a time-series model to characterize abnormal user
behavior might look as in figure 3.3. Note that the dashed
lines which represent the boundaries of the acceptable
behavior range now vary directly with the user behavior
distribution rather than remaining static as depicted in
figure 3.2. Furthermore, a time-series model may be
expected to be more sensitive to minor behavior changes than
the mean and standard deviation model.
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Figure 3.3. A Time-Series Model of User Behavior,
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A decay factor, ^- = 0.9862, is used in the IDES
enhanced prototype to give the profile data a half-life of
50 days and thereby put greater emphasis on the user's most
recent behavior [Lunt88a] . This aging seems to be an
attempt to correct for the problem of user behavior changes
over time. However, this method is probably not as
effective as a time-series model for tracking user behavior
trends. In addition, this decay factor benefits the user
who plans a future attack and who therefore gradually shifts
his/her behavior and profile toward the planned deviant
behavior. Instead, a time-series model would probably
detect even those gradual and slight variations in behavior
and the attack might be thwarted.
The time-series model applied to statistical anomaly
detection can be expected to determine the true status of
the system security with greater accuracy than the mean and
standard deviation model. In [Denn85] and [Denn87] , Denning
rejects the time-series model as being more costly [perhaps
in terms of processing speed and memory use] than the mean
and standard deviation model. However, this cost may not be
significant compared to the importance of detecting actual
intrusions and protecting individuals against the fear of
false accusations.
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3.3 OBJECTS AND MEASURES
In Chapter 1, a list of the 36 subject profile measures
currently implemented on the SRI IDES is provided (see
figure 1.2). Each of these measures would also be valid for
the LAN-IDS. Additional measures need to be included in
order to adequately track object usage and to account for
inter-network communications. Chapter 1 also outlined
the classes of object profiles suggested by Denning in
[Denn85]
. These classes are:
1) Command or Program Execution Profiles
2) File-Access Profiles
3) Database-Access Profiles
4) Other types such as system dependent or user-
defined object types.
Denning also suggested measures and objects which should
be monitored in each of these classes.
Selection of the object types to profile and the
measures to monitor for the Network Monitor Model would
depend upon the security policy of the monitored network and
on an evaluation of current security risks for that network.
Further, because of the different purposes of the LAN-IDS
and the GOM, these two levels would have different sets of
profiled objects and measures. Specifically, the profiled
objects and measures of the GOM would be a subset of those
for the LAN-IDS 's.
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At the LAN-IDS level, the objects which should probably
be profiled include all those which are highly sensitive or
otherwise security relevant, those that are reserved for
privileged users (i.e. superusers) and those whose usage
tends to reflect the general status of the system [Denn85]
.
Examples of these for the LAN-IDS include:
* Login and logout programs.
* Change password and access programs.
* Editors, compilers, linkers, mail programs, docu-
ment formatters, and utilities.
* Password files.
* All files with authorization data.
* Audit programs.
* Remote login and file transfer programs.
Those objects which should be profiled at the GOM
level are those that are:
1) highly sensitive or security relevant and are
remotely accessible from one or more different
systems within the same LAN or on a different
LAN; or are
2) existing as copies on more than one system of
the network. An important example of this
would be file-access profiling of databases.
Most of the measures suggested by Denning would be
applicable to these objects at both the LAN-IDS and GOM
levels. These measures include:
* Execution frequency.
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* Resource usage (CPU, I/O) per execution of a
particular program.
* Execution denials.
* Read, write, create and delete frequencies for a
particular file.
* Numbers of failures of those reads, writes,
creates and deletes. [Denn85]
Following are some measures which should be added to an
intrusion detection system which monitors a network:
* Remote execution frequency - a continuous
measure of the number of executions of a program
from remote systems.
* Remote access frequency - a continuous measure
of the number of accesses (read, write, create,
delete) to a file from remote systems.
* Location of command issuance - a categorical
measure of the number of times per time period
that a program is executed or a file is accessed
from a particular system (or location)
. The range
is all the systems connected to the network.
* Remote login frequency - a continuous measure of
the number of remote logins to each network host.
* Remote login frequency - a categorical measure
whose range is all the hosts on the network. It
measures the number of times a subject on one host
remotely logs onto the profiled system.
We suggest that the time period for the measures of an
object be one hour. This period length would depend on the
activity of the network, especially in respect to the
amount of activity that is associated with the monitored
objects. A LAN with especially low activity might chose a
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longer time period such as one day, but the normally
consistently high activity of a WAN dictates the shorter
time period for profiling at the GOM level.
The values for the measures are derived from the audit
matrix as discussed in [Denn85], [Denn87] and Chapter 2.
Though actually an implementation detail, a modification of
the audit matrix concept might better serve the purposes of
the Network Monitor Model. The modified audit matrix would
be a three-dimensional matrix with time added as the third
dimension. This is shown in figure 3.4. The three-
dimensional audit matrix concept allows one to more easily
visualize how to extract the data about a particular object
over each time period (one hour)
.
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Figure 3.4. The Audit Data Matrix in Three Diintensions
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A simplistic demonstration of the derivation of an
individual object profile at the LAN-IDS level is given
below. This example follows the methodology used in the
IDES [Lunt88a]
. The purpose of this example is: (1) to show
that an object profile can be produced in much the same way
and from the same audit matrix data as the subject profiles;
and (2) to illustrate the methodology used in the IDES.
Object is a database relation which can be read or
written. An error is noted if it occurs during one of the
reads or writes. The following table lists these continuous
measure values for the 24 1-hour time periods of Day 1.
Hour #Reads #Writes #Errors
1 1 1
1 2
2 2
3 1 1
4
5
6 1
7 2 5 1
8 12 20 2
9 10 4 3
10 18 16 5
11 7 8 1
12 2 2
13 21 10 2
14 28 25 4
15 26 21 7
16 12 12 1
17 10 9 1
18 5 7 2
19 6 3 1
20 11 10 3
21 13 15 3
22 7 3
23 2 2
Table 3.1 Reads, Writes and Errors on Object on Day 1
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(1) The Count is the number of time periods that a measure
was audited.
#Reads #Writes #Errors
Count = 24 24 24
(2) The Sum is the total value of each of the measures over
the day.
#Reads #Writes #Errors
Sum = 198 175 37
(3) Because this is the initial derivation of the profile,
no historical mean yet exists.
#Reads #Writes #Errors
Historical Mean=0
(4) The Cross Product Matrix is derived by using the
formula:
Cprod(x,y) =^v
;
(x)v
? {y)
#Reads #Writes #Errors
#Reads 3184 2713 600
#Writes 2713 2555 526
#Errors 600 526 135
The Covariance Matrix was derived using the formula:
Cov(x,y) = l/n(£ v» (x)vj (y)) - Mean (x) Mean (y)
#Reads #Writes #Errors
#Reads 132.667 113.042 25.000
#Writes 113.042 106.458 21.917
#Errors 25.000 21.917 5.625
The Inverse Covariance Matrix (C~') :
C~ f =
0.010 -0.075 -0.156
-0.075 0.103 -0.692
.-0.156 -0.692 1.141
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The preceding example demonstrated the derivation of
the four components of the statistical profile of the use of
an object during one day applying the statistical model used
in the IDES. The first step was to determine from the
measured audit data in Table 3.1 how many complete time
periods (in this case, hours) that each of the three
measures was observed. In this example, the number of
reads, writes and errors was observed for each of the
possible 24 time segments during which each of these
measures has been observed for this subject. Thus the
effective count for each measure is 24. The effective count
vector is the first of the four components of the profile.
The second step is to sum the values for each of the
measures over the number of time segments measured (the
count) and determine the mean values for that day. The
vector of historical mean values is the second component of
the profile. Next, the cross-product matrix, a component of
the active data which would be passed up to the global
object monitor is derived. The third component of the
object profile, the covariance matrix is derived. Note that
the values for the mean(x) and mean(y) are both zero for
this example because this is the first day of auditing and
no historical mean has yet been established. Finally, the
fourth component of the object profile, the inverse of the
covariance matrix, is determined.
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3.4 LAN-IDS
The LAN-IDS is the major component of the two-level
Network Monitor Model. It is also the first line of
intrusion detection in that it should catch the majority of
detectable intrusions. This claim is based on an intuitive
assumption that most computer abuses will originate from the
same system on which they occur and that these abuses will
usually be simpler in that they will involve a single
perpetrator acting alone.
Like the IDES, the LAN-IDS exists on a physically
separate dedicated workstation which is connected to each
LAN target system. It receives encrypted, standard-format
multiplexed datagrams from each of the target systems on the
LAN. Each datagram contains one audit record which
describes a single-object event. The audit record's
data becomes one entry in the audit matrix.
Anomaly Detection
After decrypting the datagram, the LAN-IDS has two
major tasks. One task is to analyze the audit record to
determine if it recorded an anomalous event. The steps
involved in this process are given in figure 3.5. The
statistical analysis consists of four tests: two with
subject profiles and two with object profiles. First, the
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anomaly detector performs a statistical test to compare the
subject's most recent action, as given by the audit record,
with the subject's historical behavior on that machine, as
given by the subject's profile for that machine. If the
results of this test indicate that the observed behavior was
different from the behavior expected at that point, an
anomaly is recorded and a warning is issued to the security
officer through the administrative interface. If, however,
the behavior was within the acceptable range of expected
values, no anomaly is recorded and the second layer
detection test is applied to the audit record data. The
anomaly detector performs a statistical comparison test of
the audit record data with the subject's combined profile
which portrays the user's aggregate behavior over the LAN
This test might detect a user who is distributing portions
of an abusive activity over several hosts on the same LAN in
an attempt to cover the actions. An example is a user who
attempts to browse through other's directories using many
change directory commands followed by directory listings and
file accesses. The user is clever to limit the number of
times he/she does this on each of several machines so as not
to attract attention. If this combined subject profile test
results in an anomalous finding a warning is sent to the
security officer. If nothing especially unusual is noted,
the anomaly detector conducts the next test.
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The third test of the detection process is a comparison
test that involves all of the audit record data, including
the anomalous records that were found in the first two
tests. This audit data is compared with the appropriate
object's profile for the machine involved. This test aims
to catch suspicious or abusive usage of an object when that
usage has not been revealed by the earlier two subject
profile tests. As with the subject profile test, if an
anomaly is detected, a warning is issued; otherwise, a
second layer final comparison with that object's combined
LAN profile is conducted. This test compares the object
usage as reported by the audit record data with the expected
usage of that object network wide as determined from past
usage of that object. This test might detect that although
no one user had accessed a classified file an unusual amount
of times in the last hour, the cumulative number of accesses
far exceeded the norm for that file for that time of day.
Therefore, this suspicious activity needs to be investigated
further so a warning is issued.
Concurrently with the statistical anomaly detection
process, the Expert System component would be applying tests
about the known system vulnerabilities or known attack
scenarios to the audit record data in an effort to detect
any activity which is anomalous on its own accord
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independent of the user's past activity. Otherwise, the
LAN-IDS assumes that event was not abusive unless notified
later by the GOM.
The previous description of the anomaly detection
method is effectively a filtering process. See the flow
graph given in figure 3.5. The LAN-IDS is expected to
discover most of the intrusions in the first comparison with
the subject profiles. The combined subject profile
comparison will aid in discovering those intrusions enhanced
by the networking environment. The object profile and
combined object profile comparisons are expected to help in
noting the more rare and more complex multi-user or multi-
system intrusions.
Profile Updating
The other task of the LAN-IDS upon receipt of an audit
record from the target system is to update the profiles.
This update process is independent of the anomaly detection
process. At the end of each user session (or some other
chosen time period) on a particular system, the user's
profile is updated using all of the audit records collected
for that session on that system
. If the user had accessed a
remote machine during that session, the audit data would
only record the information about the events that connect
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and disconnect with the remote machine. Any actions the
user performed on any objects at the remote machine would be
audited at the remote machine and would be used to update
the profiles pertaining to that machine. An example is
given below:
On machinel user A does
% rlogin machine2
On machine2 user A does
> user_id
> password
> rm filel
> logout
The audit records at machinel would contain
such information as the remote login to machine2,
the closing of the connection, and the connect
time. The audit records at machine2 would contain
data such as:
+ login time (remote)
+ login errors
+ origination (machinel) of remote login
+ removal of filel
+ logout (remote)
Of course, this auditing characteristic applies to object
profiling as well.
Once the subject's profile is updated, it is combined
with that same subject's profiles for each of the other
systems of the LAN. As stated earlier, the exact method for
combining the profiles would depend upon which statistical
model was used to create the individual subject profiles.
The combined profile would basically be a weighted average
(by a use factor) of the user's behavior on each of the
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LAN's systems.
This combined user profile may be useful for detecting
a user who attempts to vary his/her profile over time on one
machine in order to perform an abuse on that machine at a
later date. Unless the conniving user varied his/her
behavior on all the LAN's systems to which he/she had
access, the planned abuse might be anomalous in comparison
with the combined LAN profile.
Unlike subject (user) profiles which are updated at the
end of every user's session, all object profiles are updated
at regular intervals such as every hour. The update data
would come from all the audit records collected which
pertain to actions occuring during the past time period
(hour) upon a particular object on a particular machine.
Once all objects are updated, their profiles are combined
with their corresponding profiles on other target systems in
the same manner as the subject profiles.
3.5 GLOBAL OBJECT MONITOR
The goal of the GOM is to add depth to the Network
Monitor Model by detecting those intrusions not evident at
the LAN-IDS level. Most of the objectives it uses to meet
that goal stem from the numerous internetwork communication
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capabilities available to the network user. A partial list
of these objectives include:
1) To detect collusion between parties configured as
listed in section 2.4.
2) To detect multiple masquerade attempts made at
different sites and machines on the network.
3) To detect data aggregation resulting from multiple
accesses at several separate network locations.
4) To detect users who are able to take advantage of
time delays between entry updates to distributed databases,
i.e. a savings account holder who withdraws his full account
balance from two different bank branches in quick succession
before the central database is updated.
Due to the nature of these objectives, they normally
would not be expected to occur within a single time period.
Therefore, the GOM would not have the same urgency of
the LAN-IDS 's to detect intrusions in real time with the
intent of immediate reaction. Instead, such as in the case
of data aggregation, the GOM would build up the 'evidence'
over a period of time and would only notice an anomaly after
analyzing all the composite profiles it produces from the
information it receives from the LAN-IDS 's.
The GOM receives most of its information from the LAN-
IDS 's. The information passed to the GOM from the LAN-IDS
'
s
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includes
:
1) All audit records received by the LAN-IDS 's.
These audit records will be used in the GOM in the same way
that they are used in the LAN-IDS 's — in statistical
comparison tests and in expert system pattern matching.
2) All composite subject profiles derived by the LAN-
IDS' s. The set of composite subject profiles from a LAN-
IDS (x)
,
LCP-S(x) = [CP(sO), CP(sl) ,CP(sk)|, where CP(sk)
represents the composite profile for subject k and k is the
number of subjects profiled at LAN(x). At the GOM, the set
of global subject profiles is the union of all LCP-S(x) sets
where x is the number of monitored LAN's in the internet.
3) Composite object profiles derived by the LAN-IDS 's
as selected by the internetwork controller. These object
profiles would be those that pertain to the objects most
vulnerable to internetwork intrusion as discussed in section
2.3. An example would be a database which is distributed
over a large portion of the network. Because all LAN's may
not be controlled by the same authority, the measures they
each track for a particular object may not all be the same.
In other words, LAN A may track 20 measures about an object
O and LAN's B and C may track those same 20 measures plus 4
more. This difference will not affect the merging of the 3
profiles. Object O's global level profile will have 24
time segments. The global object profile would be the union
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of all sets LCP-O(x) { CP (oO ), CP ( ol ),..., CP ( ok ) } where
CP(ok) is the composite profile of Object k of LAN(x) and k
is the number of distinct objects profiled at LAN(x).
4) All detected anomalies for both subjects and
objects as determined by each LAN-IDS. These detected
anomalies would be useful for the Global Object Monitor
because they give the GOM more complete imformation about
the status of the network.
The LAN-IDS passes this data to the GOM at regular
intervals, e.g. during non-peak traffic times. A suggested
time interval would be daily, perhaps around midnight. The
data forwarded by the LAN-IDS must be encrypted and
checksums should be used. This is essential to protect the
privacy of the users and the integrity of the data. The
connection between the LAN-IDS and the GOM would probably be
a public communication subnet (i.e. telephone lines) which
is vulnerable to wiretapping. The GOM decrypts all data.
Data that can not be decrypted or is not in the standard
format once it is decrypted is rejected as unusable and
a potential fake introduced to the system by an unauthorized
person or process. Otherwise, the data is entered into the
GOM database. See Figure 3.6. The remainder of the
information the GOM uses is received from a security
administrator who inputs any relevant data about users and
objects directly to the Expert System Knowledge Base. This
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data could include information about personnel (user) job
relocations, personal history, criminal records, etc. These
kind of data can help the expert system and the security
officer to determine the nature of a suspicious event.
Anomaly Detection in the GOM
Once the data begins to arrive from the LAN-IDS 's, the
anomaly detection process retrieves the audit record data
from the database. The anomaly detector compares the audit
data to the statistical composite object and subject
profiles it had derived from the last update. This
statistical comparison can be conducted in the same manner
as in the LAN-IDS. Any anomalies found are reported to
the security officer, used to update the database, reported
to the LAN-IDS's and the LAN controllers, and made
available to the Expert system.
The GOM's Expert System component plays an extensive
role in anomaly detection. The Expert System works with
known system vulnerabilities, reported attack scenarios and
current intuition about suspicious behavior as does the IDES
[Lunt89]
.
In addition it uses the reported anomalies at the
LAN and global levels and the global profiles. For this
reason, and because the GOM does not detect intrusions in
real time, the Expert System begins processing the data
after the Anomaly Detector has completed. Thus, the Expert
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System has access to more complete knowledge about past
behavior of subjects and use of objects on the network.
The Expert System would use its complete knowledge of
the internet users and objects to piece together very
complex audit trails about objects and combine this with
information about subjects and intuitive attack scenarios,
etc. to detect some very complex intrusions. For example,
the Expert System might see that:
1) The GOM Anomaly Detector noted an anomalous use of
Object 0. The chief contributor to that anomaly was the 10%
higher Read measure network wide of for that past day.
2) Each of four users, A, B, C and D, displayed
behavior which was nearly anomalous based on their global
profiles - they each were at the limit of their thresholds.
Further analysis revealed that they each accessed object
slightly more often than usual that day.
3) The knowledge base reveals that although A, B, C,
and D each work for different companies at different
physical locations, they all were born in Leningrad in the
Soviet Union and defected to the United States between 1980
and 1983 while serving as border guards at the Berlin Wall.
Merging these facts with the rules in the rule base using
the Inference Engine, the Expert System could determine that
there was a strong possibility of a serious intrusion,
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perhaps a form of collusion by Soviet spies. The Expert
System would notify the security officer that this situation
needs immediate investigation and could supply him/her with
the reasons that this situation appears suspicious.
Profile Updating
The final task of the GOM is to update its global
profiles. It does this by combining the composite profiles
it receives from the LAN-IDS 's for each particular subject
and object. In other words, the GOM would combine all the
composite profiles of object A received for that day and use
this information to update its global profile for object A.
The same procedure would apply to subject profiles.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
4.0 RESULTS
The major results of this research are summarized
below:
1. A general, two level model of intrusion detection was
introduced and described for a Wide Area Network or
other network of interconnected networks. The first
(local) level provides detection capability and
monitors activity on the Local Area Networks to the
extent that the local level is aware of unusual
activity. The second (global) level provides the
secondary detection capability by its potential
knowledge of all activity on the entire network. The
Network Monitor Model solves many of the problems
associated with monitoring inter-network communication
as described in Chapter 2, sections 2.2 - 2.4.
2. The concept of monitoring objects (files, programs,
machines, etc.) as well as subjects (users, processes,
etc.) [Ande80] was incorporated into the Network
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Monitor Model at both levels. At the local (LAN-IDS)
level, object profiling was added for an extra measure
of knowledge about the security of the network
activity. At the global (GOM) level, object profiling
became the primary key to detecting unusual network
activity.
3. The concept of layered intrusion detection was
introduced in the Network Monitor Model. This approach
builds on recent advances in intrusion detection
[Lunt88x]
,
[Lunt89] modifying and strengthening it with
layers of supplemental analysis. The layering concept
is most heavily emphasized in the LAN-IDS with the
final layer being the Global Object Monitor. The
layering acts as a filtering process which attempts to
detect abuses with the minimal effort required while
having the capability to apply maximal resources to
detect the most complex intrusions. Layered intrusion
detection has the advantage of efficient, more
complete coverage of network activity.
4. The first level of the model, the LAN-IDS, was based on
Denning' s Intrusion Detection Model [Denn87] and its
prototype, the IDES [Lunt88x]
. The major functions of
the LAN-IDS were described and further clarified with
examples.
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5. The concept of a Global Object Monitor, the second
level of the Network Monitor Model, was introduced.
The purpose and functions of this global monitor were
described and examples were given.
6. Some comments were presented regarding the optimal
statistical model for conducting the statistical
intrusion detection process. Time Series Analysis was
suggested as one good approach to modeling the expected
behavior of computer system subjects and objects.
4.1 CONCLUSIONS
The research currently being conducted on automated
audit trail analysis for intrusion detection is an important
addition to computer system security. Intrusion Detection
Systems will help to ensure that other security components
such as physical security procedures and access control
mechanisms are indeed effective and will help to identify
those computer abuses such as collusion which presently are
not explicitly prevented by security mechanisms. Intrusion
detection is an extra layer of defense. When implemented in
real-time, the advantages of intrusion detection can be
extremely valuable especially when that detection
facilitates the ceasing of an attack while it is still in
progress
.
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The most important contribution of this thesis research
is the extension of the Intrusion Detection Model to the
networking environment. The research of others to date has
dealt almost exclusively with single target systems. The
research reported here goes beyond single system intrusion
detection to provide a flexible, generalized approach to
monitoring networks and networks of networks. A two level
model emphasizing combined object and subject profiling and
analysis is introduced. The strength of the model lies in
its ability to determine the complete information about all
subjects, objects or actions and use this information to
determine the security status of an entire network. As a
result of the work done here, there is a basis and general
framework for continued research towards an implementable
network intrusion detection system.
4.2 AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Throughout the investigation of automated audit trail
analysis and the subsequent research conducted for this
work, several unresolved problems and unexplored ideas were
encountered. Each of these points could themselves be the
subject of further research.
1. Statistical Anomaly Detection. As noted in section
3.2, there is some question about the best choice of a
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statistical model for profiling behavior and
determining anomalous activity. Before considering a
particular model, a sufficient amount of actual data
about user behavior and object usage needs to be
gathered in order to determine the actual distribution
of that data. Then research should be conducted to
determine the effectiveness of a time series analysis
for detecting anomalous behavior and usage.
2. One security problem of most network operating systems
exists in the remote access facilities. When accessed
from a remote site, these systems only know about the
identity of that remote site which is directly
accessing them. If that remote site is only an
intermediary, having been accessed from some other
remote site, the ultimate destination system is unaware
of this true origination. Thus it can be difficult to
track down a devious culprit or to even ascertain the
extent of some damages. A possible solution to the
situation might be derived using Lamport's Virtual
Clock Algorithm [Lamp78]
. Applying this algorithm to
the events involved in establishing remote connections
and transporting data between machines will enable the
establishment of a partial ordering of these events
[Mizu89]
.
If this ordering were known for all remote
activities throughout a network, it should be possible
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to determine the true source of every action.
Investigation into the feasibility of this theory
should be pursued.
3. Implementation. Before the worthiness of the Network
Monitor Model can be established, a prototype must be
developed to test the feasibility of the concept.
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ABSTRACT
This thesis proposes a model for intrusion detection in
a networking environment. The model represents an extension
of the Intrusion Detection Model of Denning [Denn87]
. The
intrusion detection methodology is derived from analysis of
audit log data and the notion that a computer abuse will
generally manifest itself in a departure from normal subject
behavior or object usage.
The Network Monitor Model is developed as two distinct
levels which constitute a layered approach to intrusion
detection. The first level of the model, the LAN-IDS,
monitors in real-time the activity of all computer systems
which are joined together into a local area network (LAN)
.
The LAN-IDS uses a statistical forecasting model and an
expert system to analyze audit records of security relevant
events for any abnormal subject behavior or object usage on
that LAN. The second level of the model, the Global Object
Monitor (GOM)
,
oversees the aggregate activity of multiple
connected LAN's. The GOM employs the same general
detection process as the LAN-IDS but directs its focus
towards any unusual usage of specified security relevant
objects. Though not a real-time monitor, the GOM has the
advantage of access to all the audit data of the entire
network.
